Authors

Discussion

In this presentation, based on the use of international indices (governance effectiveness, corruption perception, democracy, rule of law, and others), an assessment of the institutional capacity of the Ukrainian state is given, particularly during the Great War. Author also analyzes "capacity traps" as gaps in legislation that undermine theeffectiveness of the state governance system, and as a result, devalue the institution of political accountability and deteriorate the state’s institutional capacity. The author also explains, based on sociological surveys regarding trust in state institutions, why the decline in trust towards government bodies (with the exception of the Armed Forces and the President) increases the risks of delegitimizing the government, as this translates into a reluctance of many citizens to fulfill their civic duties, particularly with respect to mobilization, tax payments, etc.

The author identifies the inefficiency of the system of checks and balances as the key problem of the institutional capacity of the Ukrainian state, which leads to duplication of powers between branches of government, ineffective functioning of the parliament and government, excessive concentration of power in the hands of the president, and the nullification of the role of the government as the center of executive power. The author thoroughly analyzes the existing in Ukraine "capacity traps" (what has been done for the first time in domestic political science), emphasizes their cumulative negative effect, outlines the negative consequences if they persist, and proposes effective instruments of non-electoral legitimacy of power, which are extremely necessary during wartime. Particular attention is paid to the need to reform Ukraine’s constitutional system to eliminate these institutional traps. Several ways to enhance institutional capacity are outlined, including the self-legitimization of power through information policy under conditions of forced restrictions on rights and freedoms; amending the constitution and legislation to eliminate the "capacity traps"; and the use of non-electoral instruments of legitimacy of power as a temporary measure that can strengthen the state's institutional capacity, but only during the war.