Mon21 Jul04:45pm(15 mins)
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Where:
Room 12
Presenter:
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After Yugoslav communists achieved success in World War two, their revolutionary zeal was at its peak, and their political will was filled of enthusiasm. However, the constraints of their international position would teach them painful lessons about the limits of their freedom to make choices and adjustments. They managed to ascend to power in regions where the impacts of Great Depression and international political contestation were exacerbated by the combination of weak industrialization and remnants of imperial (feudal) political structures. Although their development strategy was grounded in the Lenin’s New Economic Policy, its reformist (“liberal”) nature and reliance on market principles could not be implemented in conditions of destroyed infrastructure and underdeveloped industry. The choice of this strategy was shaped from 1928 and it stems from both resolving “the national question” and addressing issues of social development. In that year, at the Fifth Party Congress, members from Croatia and Slovenia assumed leading positions in the party and adopted the federal structure of Yugoslav state as the political goal. The Yugoslav leaders’ were committed to Leninist principles, as evident in their inclination to prioritize the territorial principle of organization over the sectoral ones. Addressing “the national question” through a federalist state structure, also had consequences for the development strategy. It meant that political (state) and economic aspects of Leninist policies were closely intertwined. Since the issue of self-determination of nations was resolved in favour of party figures from Croatia and Slovenia, their approach to economic development also reflected the tendencies in their respective regions. This involved advocating for an economic approach rooted in Marxism of the most advanced elements of the pre-World War II economy. These elements were predominantly found in regions that had been under Habsburg Monarchy rule until World War I.