Authors

Beate Eschment¹;  ¹ Centre of East European and International Studies (ZOiS), Germany

Discussion

The large proportion of Russians in Kazakhstan's population (Kazakhs 40%, Russians 38%, others 22%) worried Kazakh politicians and Western observers after the country's independence. Their fears regarding disloyalty, interethnic clashes, etc. were not confirmed. In addition, the proportion of Russians in the total population fell sharply (2021 15.5 %) due to the emigration of Russians and immigration or higher birth rate of Kazakhs. As a result, the special attention paid to this population group also diminished. Disputes over the language issue or the importance of the Cyrillic script were more likely to be led by Moscow than by the Russians of Kazakhstan.

This changed abruptly with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although there have been stories of Russians learning Kazakh to distance themselves from Russia, there have also been reports of arrests of small groups of Kazakh Russians in the north of the country suspected of separatism. When talking to Kazakhs today, they are more inclined than ever to accuse their Russian fellow citizens of disloyalty. Claims by RF- Russian (rossiiskii) nationalists, and not only extreme ones, to the north of the Republic of Kazakhstan with its large Russian population and their ‘protection’ do the rest to place all members of this group under general suspicion. In contrast, little is known about the real attitude of Kazakhstani Russians, and under the given circumstances it is hardly possible to conduct opinion polls on their attitude towards the war and potential territorial claims of the RF.

However, the results of two representative opinion polls conducted by us in Almaty in 2019 and 2024 can at least provide a component for a better-founded picture of their identity, attitude to the state of Kazakhstan and expectations for the future. In addition to 250 Armenians, Dungans, Kyrgyz, Kurds and Chechens, the same number of Russians (and Kazakhs) were asked about the strength of their ethnic and civic (Kazakhstani) identity, their assessment of past and future nationality policy and possible thoughts of emigration. Although the Russians' answers were always below the overall average of the answers, they were never in last place in the specific comparison of the surveyed ethnicities. In 2024, a stronger pro-Kazakhstani attitude than in 2019 is emerging in several questions, along with polarisation. The analysis of the data is in progress, but it is already apparent that the attitude of Russians in Almaty to the above questions does not differ significantly from that of the other nationalities surveyed and, above all, does not indicate pro-Russian Federation or disloyal attitudes. More and more detailed results will be available in July 2025.