Authors

Discussion

Two years after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, on the surface there seems to be continuity of Russian influence in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but this belies significant shifts under the surface in a rapidly evolving geopolitical context. Drawing on insights from feminist and decolonial geopolitics as well as our previous work in the region, we show how and why we should look beyond an elite-centric view of geopolitics to the geopolitical imaginaries of ordinary people. We argue that this is not just an ethical concern but can help us better understand empirical processes currently underway. 

It has long been argued that the idea of Central Asia as a Russian ‘backyard’ or of regional geopolitics as Great Game decided by external Great Powers is reductionist (Cooley 2016). However, critiques have mostly highlighted the rational agency of Central Asian elites, rather than paying attention to local geopolitical affect and imaginaries expressed by ordinary people in different walks of life. In previous work, we have shown how the legitimacy of political elites in Krygyzstan in the 2010s was strengthened by close association with Russia because of deep-rooted popular imaginaries of affective space between Russia and Central Asia, and associated imaginaries of ‘state-ness’ (Ortmann 2018). The full-scale invasion of Ukraine sent shock waves through the region, with public demonstrations in support of Ukraine in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Analysts at the time predicted that Central Asian countries would move away from Russia. Two years later however, the relationship of these countries with Russia is as close as ever, in spite of a renewed interest in the region by the West. Does this demonstrate that elite geopolitics is all that matters? We argue that this isn’t the case, and that there are reasons why popular support for a close relationship with Russia has remained high – but also that this is in light of important reconfigurations affecting different strata of society (differently in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan). Reconfiguration of labour migration, the emergence of a younger generation of well-educated urban middle class beginning to question historical legacies of Soviet rule, but also the emergence of both Kazakhstan and Krygyzstan as hubs of Russian sanction evasion are part of how entanglements with and imaginaries of Russia are changing among populations. At the same time, support for Russia remains high among part of the population. Kazakh and Kyrgyz elites are navigating the issue of association with Russia more carefully than before, but regime legitimacy remains an important element of how the relationship with Russia is conducted. We conclude that popular imaginaries and practices co-produce a strong association with Russia, but the parameters are shifting.