Authors

Discussion

I argue that Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s invasion instigated an “exogenous shock” to Russian collective memory narratives, disrupting the tenet of victory – rooted in discourses about the “Great Patriotic War” – that has underpinned the evolution of Russian post-Soviet identity. The shock is especially egregious given its instigation by a nation that has predominantly figured in Russian collective memory as colonial, categorically inferior, festering with Nazism, unqualified for independent statehood, and often undeserving of the acknowledgment of existence.

What does it mean for state rhetoric to forward an identity of a collective of winners – of victors? I offer a framework that outlines two considerations that must predominate if state rhetoric is to champion the tenet of victory as an essential and unifying component of national identity. The framework evolves from a foundation common to all nation-building processes, namely an inclination to delve into a “usable past” to curate a national idea for the present while sidelining history’s darker aspects. From there, state authorities must first rely on the presence of others – including both formidable and inferior enemies –to ground the nation’s self-understanding and inform national policy priorities.  In the case of post-Soviet Russia, state rhetoric has conveniently given citizens the impression that the country is surrounded by a bunch of losers, or at least people and states that can be convincingly defined in comparable terms. Such an imagined arrangement is not unlike the idea from the Soviet era, that the RSFSR and ethnic Russians were at the core of an emerging Soviet patriotism – ‘the first among equals.’ The phrase reflects a fundamentally relational and hierarchical conceptualization of self-understanding – for to be ranked “better than” one must be in the presence of someone who is ranked “less than,” and to be a winner, there must be someone to play the role of a loser.  Second, as a collective of winners, if you’re going to pick a fight, you make sure you pick one you know you can win. That Russian authorities so miscalculated the prospects of their invasion has unexpectedly threatened the rhetorical foundations of Russian identity – it was likely never envisioned that the identity would be at stake amidst a brief “special military operation,” an endeavor that, notably, can’t be lost. 

Ukrainians’ determination to secure an independent and democratic future meant that a crucial member of Russia’s “inferior others” threatened to chart its own course and, if successful, could eventually call into question the relational roots of Russian post-Soviet identity and the stability of Putin’s authoritarian regime. Once the invasion met a determined resistance, the continued relevance of the tenet of victory necessitated that Ukraine either succumb to Russia’s terms – that is, exist as its humbled vassal – or not at all.