Authors

Damian Szacawa¹;  ¹ Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Poland

Discussion

After the end of the Cold War, the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) and the Arctic have seen a particular increase in more or less institutionalised initiatives by various actors attempting to influence the shaping of the international order in this area of the world (Cottey 1999; Aalto, Espíritu, Kilpeläinen & Lanko 2017; Biedermann 2020; Szacawa 2021). This change resulted from internal factors, e.g., trends leading to a redistribution of power among individual actors and regional stakeholders (Buzan & Wæver 2003; Barnett & Duvall 2005; Adler & Greve 2009), and external disruptions - factors and violent events such as the full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine (Etzold 2022; Friede 2022; Gänzle, Tynkkynen & Kern 2023).

It is Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 that marks a new era in the activity of sub-regional cooperation structures in (BSR) and the Arctic. The consequences of these disruptions significantly affect regional institutions like the Arctic Council (AC), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), and the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), especially their perception of threats and poly-crises and their ability to transform the regional regime to mitigate wicked problems. The paper aims to analyse the nature of the critical juncture (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007; Fioretos, Falleti & Sheingate 2016), which creates a growing sense of insecurity and uncertainty among regional stakeholders. Second, a comparative analysis of the role and function of international organisations in the new dynamic conditions. Third, a reflection on the progressive change in the identity of sub-regional cooperation structures.