The presentation will examine the evolution of anti-Western and revisionist rhetoric in Russian foreign policies during Putin’s time in office, especially after February, 2022. It will analyse how Russian foreign policy has been based on the Kremlin’s interests in the energy export area, how influential this factor has been during the years in question, and how this policy has evolved. This study will research the formation of the new anti-Western stance in Russian foreign policy grounded in the concept of ‘Greater Eurasia’ and how this addresses the Kremlin’s needs in 'real' world.

My research aims to understand to what extent Russian foreign policy initially depended on the direction of its crucial exports, showing how the Russian Foreign Office’s rhetoric reflects the interests of the Kremlin’s top power contributors. From here, I aim to study how Russia’s recent statements regarding its ‘turn to the East’, its advocacy of 'traditional values' and confrontation with the West might reflect underlying Kremlin interests and how and to what extent this stance has served the Kremlin’s export purposes or even given them new meaning.

I am arguing the idea that the rivalry with the West today is neither, as Russia claims, a ‘historical turn’ nor a ‘return to tradition’, but more ‘a historical power shift’. Thus, I will be arguing that a reliance on exports and the attendant rhetoric in foreign policy has been a result of the failure to keep up with the West in the high-tech development race. Russia’s attempt ‘to restore historical justice’ is a thin cover for their ‘old-fashioned’ monopolistic ambitions in the energy market, which serves them as a tool for exerting influence in world politics. I will argue that ‘the return to the East’ and to ‘traditional values’ is thus nothing more than a ‘white flag’ signifying Russia’s abandonment of high-tech competition with the West and with China.