The scholarly literature on disinformation seems to be broadly united in its understanding of the concept as disseminated information that is intentionally misleading. Yet there seems to be a divide in the debate with regard to whether the content propagated should be ‘false’ by any possible objective or material measure, or whether the term simply indicates material and activities designed to inculcate an outlook among audience members that is non-normatively preferred by the analyst, that is, subjective criteria. When it comes to religious doctrine, it is problematic to delineate between the two approaches from a position outside the respective ideational framework. The Russian Orthodox Church has widely been considered the main traditional faith of the Russian people. Yet in recent years movements such as the (now banned) ultranationalist Slavic Union, and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration have acknowledged Slavic neo-Paganism as the second religion of Russians. While neo-Paganism remains a heterogeneous and numerically marginal movement in contemporary Russia, the number of those identifying with neo-Pagan worldviews such as Rodnoverie are increasing, and, with members often concentrated among key nodes in the power structures such as the security services, their influence has the potential to bely their apparently limited prevalence. This paper will outline the information, value and spiritual challenge posed to the Orthodox tradition by extreme right Slavic neo-Pagan ideation in Russia. It will trace how the church strives to response to this challenge.
