Nivedita Kapoor1; 1 Higher School of Economics, Russian Federation
Discussion
The role of BRICS and SCO in Russian foreign policy has been expanding steadily since the mid-2000s. As Russia’s ties with the west came under strain, it began a process of moving towards building alternative institutions with the narrative stressing rise of a multipolar world, decline of the west and its own positioning as a promoter of equitable rights for the developing world.
In this interpretation, Russia assigned itself a special place in the formation of a new world order, with BRICS and SCO as important instruments towards this end. The presence of both India and China, as well as other emerging powers in these two organizations, was seen as further evidence of a changing world order. This Russian narrative seeks to present a picture of the non-western world as possessing a broadly common vision for reformed multilateralism and a new world order. While conceding that the emerging powers do aspire for enhanced representation in existing institutions and remain dissatisfied with the current pace of reforms; this paper seeks to problematize the Russian portrayal of the emergence of a ‘global majority’ through a case study of BRICS and SCO.
Focusing on three key breaks that marked a new phase of shift in Russian policymaking - 2008 NATO summit, 2014 Ukraine crisis/annexation of Crimea and 2022 invasion of Ukraine - the paper will demonstrate how the utility of BRICS and SCO for Russia has evolved over the years. And when simultaneously combined with the examination of positions of India and China within this timeframe; it will highlight how the role these organizations play in the foreign policies of three key players has varied over the years, with both goals and alignments undergoing shifts depending on national foreign policy objectives and their evolving positions in the international system. In addition, it will look at the institutionalization of BRICS and SCO and their deliverables over the years to critically examine the quality of multilateral engagement within these two organizations. Together this will reveal the challenges for Russian foreign policy in building effective non-western multilateralism institutions that could shape a new world order.
