The paper uses the concept of ‘civil religion’, usually applied to US politics, to explore the changing uses of religion in Russian politics. Russian state-Church relations have usually been seen as primarily pragmatic partnering, despite increasing shared emphasis on ideational rhetoric and (in particular) civilizational discourses. Patriarch Kirill’s wartime statements have garnered attention for their jingoistic patriotism and gung-ho support for the ‘special military operation’. Does the pre-war paradigm still apply, or has the war ushered in a new phase in Church-state relations? This paper examines this question from the perspective of Russia’s key nominally secular politicians, both in the regime and ‘systemic opposition’, to ask how they have conceptualised the Church’s changing position in light of both the increasing civilizational discourse and the Church’s contribution to the ideological justification for war. To what degree is there symphony or deviation between Church, regime and systemic opposition positions, and to what degree is any rapprochement more substantive than standard invocations of Russian ‘spirituality’ and shared deprecation of immoral Western liberalism?
