Authors

Discussion

The relationship between de facto states and their patrons has always been characterised by a certain level of volatility. The two do not necessarily see eye to eye; cross-pressures may lead the patron to reduce support for its benefactor; or it may simply no longer be able to offer previous levels of support. However, this volatility has been compounded by recent geopolitical turmoil. Following the 2020 war, Armenia’s willingness and ability to support Nagorno Karabakh was significantly reduced, and Russia’s security guarantee for the entity turned out to be unreliable. Geopolitical instability also seems to have rendered some patrons more overtly interventionist. Whereas patrons have frequently exercised power from behind the scenes, we now see more examples of direct interference, for example in the 2020 presidential elections in Northern Cyprus. Drawing on new empirical evidence, this paper examines the effects of geopolitical instability, and an apparent relaxation of the norms of territorial integrity, on the relationship between de facto states and their patrons. This includes a discussion of whether it still makes sense to analyse these territories through a framework of de facto independent, state-like entities.