Authors

Anton Shekhovtsov¹;  ¹ Central European University, Austria

Discussion

Western academic research has tended to analyse the far right, especially in Eastern Europe, primarily through the lens of Political Science, and so has principally focused on topics such as party systems, electoral behaviour, and ideological positioning. As a result, the existing research has largely neglected factors of internal and external manipulations, ranging from pervasive political and media corruption through frequent use of political technology, to foreign interference and political warfare.
Andrew Wilson defines political technology as “that part of politics which views politics a (mere) technology. It sees politics as artifice, manipulation, engineering or programming. [...] Political technology is political engineering that is dark and covert, non-transparent and often fraudulent”.
The paper focuses on three cases of the far right being – rather than fully independent political actors – instruments of political technology employed by more significant political forces to maintain and consolidate power.
(1) In the late 1980s, the Soviet authorities, including the KGB, established controlled opposition parties like the so-called Liberal-Democratic Party to mimic political diversity. In post-Soviet Russia, the Kremlin continued this strategy under Vladimir Putin, supporting far-right entities and extremist groups to manipulate nationalist sentiment, weaken democratic forces, and consolidate authoritarian control.
(2) In the lead-up to Ukraine’s 2004 presidential elections, the pro-Russian Ukrainian authorities attempted to undermine pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko by staging fake far-right demonstrations allegedly in his support and creating fake nationalist candidates to divert votes. Later, during Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency, his political strategists covertly boosted the far-right “Freedom” party through media manipulation to weaken mainstream opposition, resulting in the party’s significant electoral gains in the 2012 parliamentary elections at the expense of major opposition parties.
(3) In Georgia, the “Georgian Dream” (GD) party, since its foundation in 2012, has opposed the pro-European United National Movement (UNM) in particular by indirectly empowering far-right groups to challenge the UNM without openly associating with the far right and, thus, undermining the GD’s pro-European image. This strategy allowed the GD to deflect criticism of its Russia-friendly policies and gauge public tolerance for pro-Russian sentiment.