Authors

Discussion

In September 2022, approximately six months after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian government announced a partial mobilisation in order to call up men to serve in the Armed Forces. According to Russian legislation, military mobilisation, whether full or partial, should be accompanied by economic mobilisation, as a supportive measure. However, the Russian government has so far refrained from announcing any overt economic mobilisation, though it has taken numerous measures to adapt the economy to wartime conditions, including gradually raising military expenditure.

As the war in Ukraine has turned into a war of attrition, economic factors become increasingly important. More and more men and resources are needed for the military, which means the rest of the economy, which supports the civilian population, has to make do with less resources. In addition, the sanctions imposed by the Western coalition have further strained Russia’s economy. In this context, Russian economists, officials, academics and analysts have weighed in on whether Russia’s current economic policy is adequate. Some commentators have argued that Russia should mobilise its economy in order to aid the war effort and help Russia prevail as quickly as possible, while others have cautioned that military expenditure is already too high and risks damaging the economy irreversibly.

Drawing on academic publications, commentaries in media and specialised publications, and analyses by institutions such as the Central Bank of Russia, the paper will shed light on the Russian debate on the country’s wartime economic policy.