Authors

Discussion

This paper investigates the relationship between citizens’ engagement with the news media and their perceptions of disinformation, based on survey data from Ukraine in 2021, the year before Russia’s full-scale invasion. Previous research has demonstrated a clear link between the use of Russian and ‘pro-Russian’ news sources in Ukraine and belief in certain types of disinformation (e.g. Szostek and Orlova 2022, Hale, Shevel and Onuch 2018). Between 2014 and 2022, Ukraine and its international partners responded to the challenge of Russian-sponsored disinformation with a range of policy measures, including numerous media literacy initiatives and investment intended to strengthen Ukraine’s domestic media. However, we lack research which tests the assumptions on which these policy interventions were based: Is more ‘media literate’ engagement with the news media associated with more accurate perceptions of disinformation? Does the use of higher-quality domestic news sources make belief in foreign-sponsored (Russian) disinformation less likely? This paper aims to test these assumptions by analysing data from an original representative survey that was conducted across several Ukrainian regions in 2021 (n = 4,160). The survey data includes not only finely grained information about participants’ news media repertoires, but also information about their media literacy and the quality and depth of their engagement with the news. The paper examines whether these variables affect participants’ perceptions of disinformation and their ability to distinguish accurate headlines from inaccurate ones. The paper also documents how patterns of engagement with the news media and perceptions of disinformation varied across different regions of Ukraine, shedding light on politically salient similarities and differences between Ukraine’s regions prior to Russia’s attempt to break up the Ukrainian state by force.