Authors

Pål Kolstø¹; Helge Blakkisrud¹;  ¹ University of Oslo, Norway

Discussion

De facto states, states which have unilaterally seceded from another state, but are recognized by no or only a handful of other states, as rule depend upon a stronger state – a patron – for sustenance and protection against recapture. These patron-client relationships (PCRs) are characterized by a high degree of power asymmetry. Our previous research has documented that de facto client states nevertheless often have a high degree of independent agency vis-à-vis the patron. In many cases they have endeavoured, and largely achieved, to develop a political system very different from the patron state. Two of the most noteworthy cases in this respect are Abkhazia vs Russia and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) vs Turkey.

Both Turkey and Russia are rated “not free” by Freedom House, Turkey with 33/100 points and Russia with no more than 13/100 points. The contrast to the clients in both cases is remarkable: Abkhazia scores 39/100 points (partly free), and the TRNC, 76/100 (free). Hence, the patrons have failed to use their considerable leverage over the clients to mould it in their own image.

Abkhazia and the TRNC have both dropped somewhat in the assessment of western democracy experts in recent years. Freedom House explains its downgrading of the TRNC by the increasing overt interference of Turkish authorities in TRNC domestic affairs, most egregiously in the 2020 presidential elections. However, despite Turkish pressure, its preferred candidate received no more than 52% of the vote. Clearly, Ankara cannot simply dictate politics in this client state. Similarly, Moscow has exerted considerable pressure on its Abkhazian client to accommodate its wishes, but with mixed results. For a long time, the opening up of the Abkhazian real estate market to Russian investors has been on the top of the Russian wish list, but the Abkhazians have been extremely reluctant to do so.

Drawing on fieldwork, interviews and media reports, the paper explores the complicated tug-of-war between the patron and the client in these two dyads and, in particular, the reasons why the weaker party, the client, often – but not always—has been able to stave off patron attempts to interfere in their domestic affairs. We hypothesize that in the two cases in question, client state leaders, due to the existence of a vibrant civil society, can mobilize their population to back up their position to a higher degree and thus create a counterweight to patron state demands.  Moreover, the client has more vested interest in the PCR than the patron: in the patron capital, life in the client state is just one minor issue among many others, while for the client it is of paramount importance. Even so, the clients are under a constant pressure to accommodate, and the PRC equilibrium fluctuates over time.