Authors

Amane Tanaka¹;  ¹ The University of Tokyo, Japan

Discussion

Ever since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, interest in Islam and religious observance has grown exponentially in Central Asian republics. Along with moderate and traditional forms of Islam, radical and fundamentalist interpretations have also risen to prominence, prompting governments to resort to tough measures to counter the spread of Islamic extremism. The official narrative of Central Asian governments, echoed by China’s stance on Xinjiang, has been that Islamic radicalization has foreign origins. The authorities insist that extremist activities have been sponsored from abroad, pointing to the spread of Salafi jihadi ideology and the threats emanating from Afghanistan. This common threat perception led Central Asian governments to endorse China’s concept of the ‘three evils’ of ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism, and enhance counter-terrorism cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) framework. 

　　The overall aim of this study is to examine China’s evolving security footprint in Greater Central Asia (GCA) in relation to counter-terrorism across the multilateral, minilateral and bilateral levels. The study is divided into two distinct sections. The first focuses on the period between the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. The second deals with geostrategic shifts that occurred in the wake of the Taliban’s return to power and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Section 1 offers an in-depth analysis of the emergence and evolution of the following security mechanisms: 1) the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) and the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group, 2) the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM), and 3) the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. Section 2 focuses on the challenges China and its neighbors face in connection to the Taliban’s 2021 takeover of Afghanistan and their efforts to adjust to a new geostrategic reality. At the regional level, Afghanistan’s observer status in the SCO has remained inactive since September 2021, and the Taliban were not invited to the 2022, 2023, and 2024 SCO Summits. At the minilateral level, China has been left to navigate increasingly strained ties between the Tajik and Pakistani governments and the Taliban, as well as expand funding and technical assistance to its neighbours. As for Russia’s security engagement with CA, in light of its military failures in Ukraine, there are growing concerns about what sort of guarantees and military help Moscow can truly offer. 

　　The purpose of the conclusion is twofold: 1) to offer a framework for the understanding of counter-terrorism cooperation in GCA, and 2) to contribute to the ongoing discussion on non-Western responses to transnational security threats and how those responses relate to liberal interventionism.