Authors

Ian Storey⁴; James Brown⁵; Marcin Kaczmarski³; Natasha Kuhrt¹; Marc Lanteigne²;  ¹ King's College London, UK;  ² UiT – The Arctic University of Norway, Norway;  ³ Glasgow University, UK;  ⁴ ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore;  ⁵ Temple University, Japan

Discussion

This Roundtable will examine how Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has impacted Moscow’s relations with key Indo-Pacific states, including China, Japan, India and Southeast Asia. China is the focus of Russia’s Asia policy. Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated both the resilience of Moscow-Beijing ties and their limitations. China has offered political and economic support but Beijing has not entered into any major agreements with Moscow, including the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline. Moreover, although both states have pledged deepened cooperation in the Arctic, the reality is that the two powers have differing Arctic visions which have been exacerbated since 2022. For Japan, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 put a definitive end to the rapprochement in Russo-Japanese relations that had begun in 2012 under Japan's Abe Shinzo. The Roundtable assesses the prospects of a revival in Japan-Russia relations and analyses how the invasion has impacted Japan's security thinking in the Indo-Pacific. For India, the invasion has weakened its relations with Russia, but Moscow is still useful to balance relations with China. The invasion has strained India’s relations with Russia while Moscow disapproves of India’s Quad membership. Russia's more open support for Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific is testing Russia-India relations. In Southeast Asia, country responses to the war have been shaped by three factors: history, principles and national interests. Myanmar has endorsed the invasion while Singapore has condemned Russia and imposed sanctions. The other ASEAN members have adopted neutral positions to avoid becoming entangled in major power competition. Russian arms sales to the region have plummeted.