Authors

Matthew Blackburn¹;  ¹ Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Norway

Discussion

For the last years, any sign of chaos of Russian politics has been predictably weaponised in the West. In contrast, Russian state media projects its own vision of order, government performance and the message of “business as usual”. This paper investigate where the truth is between these two extremes. I begin with a review of the basic procedures and performance of power over 2022-24, and examine the argument that the basic mechanisms and practices of Russian politics remain similar to the covid-19 period. While little has changed, System credibility and legitimacy may have increased in line with the perception of performing admirably despite the stress test of sanctions and running military operations. To test this argument, two areas of apparent chaos and incompetence in system performance are examined in retrospective: (1) the partial mobilisation and the question of military incompetence Feb-Sept 2022; (2) the Prigozhin affair and the arrest of Igor Strelkov for crossing redlines. I contrast this by reviewing the quiet successes: (1) the institutional independence and competence of (1) the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance; (2) the Mishustin government and its growing portfolio. To conclude, I highlight three areas upon which regime performance and legitimacy will depend: (1) great power status and the need to clearly defeat NATO in Ukraine; (2) state capacity, new leftwing policies and the struggle to stop living standards from falling; (3) geoeconomics and the new military Keynesianism as a basis for a new social contract.