After the Russian invasion of Ukraine began in 2014 with the seizing of Crimea and military action in Donbas, it was no longer possible for Ukrainian elites to ignore the importance of an effective military to state survival. Ukraine’s defence minister during 2019-20, Andriy Zagorodniuk, claimed that before 2014 the lack of democratic control of the armed forces was a cause of the degradation of Ukraine’s military capabilities because the armed forces ‘were not controlled by anyone’ permitting both corruption and people ‘working against the Ukrainian army’ to operate within the ministry, factors that facilitated the invasion. ). Therefore, reforming civil-military relations became a policy priority as part of the broader package of adopting NATO standards and principles, not only as a step closer to membership of this organisation but as normatively desirable for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the armed forces and the quality of democracy in Ukraine. Based on interviews conducted in Kyiv in 2021, the paper will explore how actors understand the main tasks for establishing Democratic Civilian Control in Ukraine in the period immediately prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion and finds that while considerable progress was made under Zelensky, in some key areas NATO partners were asking more of Ukraine than of existing members, leading to reforms becoming blocked.
