Authors
Vassily Klimentov1; 1 University of Zurich, Switzerland Discussion
Russia’s ontological security has historically been linked with its international status. Russian elites, and most ordinary Russians, cannot imagine their country as anything else than a great power. Having shelved its superpower dreams in 1990, Moscow has pivoted to pushing for a modern-day ‘Concert of Nations’ that would maintain a balance of power and where Russia would be one among equal great powers. This aspiration, this article shows, has been incarnated in Moscow’s appeals for a ‘multipolar’ international system where the US superpower would have been tamed. In 2022, Russia’s wish to achieve such multipolarity has been one of its motivations to invade Ukraine. Interestingly, many (semi)autocratic countries – including China, India, Iran, Turkey, South Africa, and Brazil – have welcomed Russia’s calls for a multipolar order that would prevent US meddling in their domestic affairs and ensure their international status linked to their ontological security. Yet, the limit to Russia’s multipolar system remains its conceptual fuzziness and limited practical applicability in the 21st century. The article illustrates this point by analysing Russian policy in Afghanistan, Syria, and the South Caucasus, three crisis regions where, taking advantage of the reflux of US influence, Russia has tried to bring its multipolar ideas to life in collaboration with other regional powers. 
