Authors

Discussion

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian armed forces had a profound impact on the perception of the Russian military. Despite formidable technical capabilities, Russia's military performance was perceived as lacking in strategic, operational, and tactical aspects that prevented Moscow from achieving overwhelming dominance in Ukraine. Surprising many analysts, the Russian military failed to adequately prepare for the invasion and exploit its comparative advantages over the Ukrainian armed forces. However, as the conflict progressed, the Russian military demonstrated varying degrees of tactical, operational, and strategic adaptability, indicating an ongoing institutional learning process. Barring a change in Russian leadership, Moscow will likely seek to rebuild and upgrade its military capabilities in line with its official warmongering narratives and skyrocketing defense expenditures. In this study, I focus on exploring the intangible factors that Moscow could address to significantly influence Russia's military modernization during a ceasefire or after the war with Ukraine. By drawing on the literature on 23 years of defense policymaking in Putin's Russia, incorporating insights from my previous research interviews, and analyzing data on Russia's current military problems, I identify the most and least likely areas for improvement in the Russian military. The study examines the institutional and political steps the Kremlin will likely take to repair its damaged but still dangerous military. By addressing these factors, the study seeks to shed light on the potential paths to improving Russia's military capabilities in a post- or frozen conflict environment and to inform Western defense policymaking toward Russia.