Authors

Discussion

The saga of Yevgeny Prigozhin demonstrated that Vladimir Putin’s political rule needs informal actors who can compensate for the inefficiency of official actors and partially satisfy the regime’s ambitious geopolitical visions. The PMC Wagner was the regimeʼs spearhead for allocating the Kremlinʼs limited resources (in comparison with great powers) in attempts to increase Russiaʼs influence particularly in the global south. Its effectiveness was based on its autonomy, fueled by Prigozhinʼs business and political ambitions while his revolt demonstrated the threat for the Putin regime based on risk-averse loyalty and inaction.

This paper examines the structural tension arising from the decentralization of the monopoly of violence built to protect Putinʼs position in the aftermath of Prigozhin-Wagner mutiny. After its elimination Wagnerʼs tasks and assets are being integrated under the Ministry of Defense and Rosgvardiya; an action that reveals Putinʼs idea to maintain the decentralization of the monopoly of violence between the central armed power centers as they fill the room that was left by the player that became too autonomous. At the same time, further reliance on risk averse and less entrepreneurial cadres forces the leadership to create ad hoc “pockets of efficiency” in the future as well in conducting tasks that cannot be performed by the state bureaucracy. However, such gray zone actors enable political risks culminated in the late-June mutiny that should not be repeated anymore. What kind of ways is the Kremlin trying to find to solve this dilemma or is it even possible for the current system?