Authors

Discussion

In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU banned Russian propaganda media. By frequently exploiting fringe communities’ grievances with democratic societies, e.g. by amplifying far-right, conspiracy and populist tropes [1]. Russian information warfare has sought to undermine the cohesion of Western liberal democracies. To prevent such manipulation, that also undermines European resolve during its largest security crisis, the EU implemented the so-called Geo-block, banning the dissemination of the two Russian propaganda media Sputnik and Russia Today within the Union’s borders [2]. Though legitimized as a self-preserving countermeasure to Russian information warfare, the decision still was an unprecedented act of censorship that clashed with liberal principles of press freedom. We therefore ask if the Geo-block was effective?

While the Geo-block may have limited access to Russian propaganda media [3], the academic literature is divided on the effectiveness of censorship, as it may also increase the demand for non-banned pro-Russian media and content [4]. This is only further complicated by numerous alternative platforms, which increase accessibility to banned content by allowing for cross-platform sharing [5]. Hence we ask if the geo-block affected fringe audiences’ i) consumption of banned Russian media, ii) non-banned Russian media, iii) the consumption of alternative platforms and iv) how popular was pro-Russian content on the most popular alternative platform?

Using a dataset on fringe communities in Western Europe on Facebook, previously collected by Authors (Forthcoming), we test these expectations by studying fringe communities’ posting patterns 3 months before and after the Geo-block came into effect. We find evidence that consumption of banned Russian propaganda media was reduced and did not increase the consumption of other non-banned pro-Russian media. While the geo-block did not affect the consumption of alternative platforms, the share of pro-Russian content doubled on the most popular alternative platform within the fringe community.

 [1] LUCAS, E. & POMERANZEV, P. 2016. Winning the Information War: Techniques and Counter-Strategies in Russian Propaganda. Center for European Policy Analysis, Washington DC.[2] RAMSAY, G. & ROBERTSHAW, S. 2019. Weaponising news RT, Sputnik and targeted disinformation. King's College London, London.[3] GOLOVCHENKO, Y. 2022. Fighting Propaganda with Censorship: A Study of the Ukrainian Ban on Russian Social Media. The Journal of Politics, 84, 639-654.[4] PAN, J. & SIEGEL, A. A. 2019. How Saudi Crackdowns Fail to Silence Online Dissent. American Political Science Review, 114, 109-125.[5] RAUCHFLEISCH, A. & KAISER, J. 2021. Deplatforming the Far-right: An Analysis of YouTube and BitChute, Annual Conference of the International Communication Association.