Authors

Discussion

The spread of disinformation has recently been recognized as a threat by public officials and the media to political participation, public health, and even democracy itself. Scholars have highlighted the specific dangers of hostile foreign actors, especially Russia, spreading disinformation to sow division or undermine trust in democratic institutions (Jankowicz 2020; Weiss 2020; Walker 2018). Yet when the notion of disinformation is salient, partisan actors may strategically invoke disinformation to raise doubts about, or distract from, politically damaging information. This is especially the case in divided societies, where information about the political world is absorbed through partisan lenses. 

Whereas other scholars have studied the effects of exposure to mis/disinformation, we situate disinformation in its political context by assessing how people respond to claims about disinformation. And while previous scholarship has focused on why people believe false information, we also consider an equally insidious problem: when allegations of disinformation cause people to doubt factual information. 

We assess how effectively claims of disinformation can be used to evade accountability via a survey experiment on a nationally representative sample in Georgia, a country long subject to Russian interventions, including being targeted by disinformation. Georgians are largely pro-West, with the public strongly supportive of membership in the EU and NATO yet a critical political cleavage involves foreign policy alignment. The opposition United National Movement is vehemently anti-Russian, whereas the ruling Georgian Dream is more pragmatic, conservative, and critical of the West. 

We leverage this polarization and varying foreign policy preferences to assess how party preferences interact with geopolitical perceptions to shape responses to claims of disinformation. Respondents are shown a vignette in which a presidential candidate, either from Georgian Dream or UNM, is alleged to have committed corruption. They are randomly assigned one of four denials from the candidate: (1) he is innocent (2) he innocent and is a victim of disinformation (3) he is innocent and is a victim of Russian disinformation (4) he is innocent and is a victim of Russian disinformation. Later the State Security Service of Georgia uncovers evidence of a Russian disinformation campaign against the candidate. Respondents state whether they believe the accusation and how likely they are to vote for the candidate. 

This paper stakes out new ground in the study of propaganda. We show how the disinformation discourse, coupled with polarized politics, provides cynical actors with a powerful tool to obfuscate inconvenient facts. These findings point to a downside to the otherwise justified efforts of policy makers, scholars, and media to highlight the threat of disinformation.