Authors
Anna Kuteleva1; Sergei Ivanov2; 1 University of Wolverhampton, UK; 2 Institute of history, archaeology and ethnology, Far-Easter Branch of Russian Academy of Science, Russian Federation Discussion
Since the late 1980s, the vast and diverse Russian Far East has been a territory of interchangeable special development mechanisms. To unlock the potential of its eastern periphery, the state creates comprehensive regional development programs, attempts to replicate the success of special economic zones of other countries, and signs unique production sharing agreements with Russia’s neighbors. The key goal of all these manifold development projects that replaced each other over the span of the last four decades is to attract foreign investors and stimulate regional modernization. However, the result turns out to be the same: the projects failed to meet the expectations of both locals and investors. Our paper asks why this is the case. We start by identifying the role of the Russian Far East in discourses of Russia’s “greatpowerness” and show how these discourses are manifested in regional development policies. Here, we focus on politics of the future and explain how the state imagination reconstructs the Russian Far East as a space of opportunities. Further, we examine how the state has been defending its monopoly on the potentiality of the Russian Far East throughout the 1980s and the 2010s based on six case studies: Nakhodka special economic zone, Sakhalin-I and Sakhalin-II projects, Amur Oil Refinery, the “Free Port Vladivostok” special economic zone, and bridges over the Amur River. 
