Authors

Discussion

Over Putin’s third term (2012-2018) Kremlin legitimation methods shifted towards harder identity politics, thicker ideological stances and increasing securitisation , a direction often referred to as “Fortress Russia”. Over the last three years “Fortress Russia” has become more entrenched, with new steps were taken to repress critical voices and co-opt new forces to ensure visible elite unity and reduce protest potential. This paper examines a key pillar of regime stability over the last three years: legitimation, which is interpreted through the categories of performance, ideology and procedure. To do this, I examine major speeches, landmark policies and PR events on the federal level (President, Prime Minister, State Duma, Senate) and regional (governors, mayors) over the two years up to the invasion (2020-22) and the year following (Feb 2022-Feb 2023). The comparison of these sources tests the thesis that legitimation strategies, especially after the war, differ in Moscow and St. Petersburg compared to other regional centres. I conclude by evaluating how far the war in Ukraine acts as a way out of a “legitimacy crisis” building in 2018-2022 and some of the unforeseen consequences this may have for Russian politics.