Authors

Discussion

This paper analyses the way populist and nationalist forces have been repressed and co-opted over a critical period (2014-2022) and how the one year of the war in Ukraine has affected this. While nationalists, leftists, Navalny-supporters and liberals have all been subject to repression, other conservative, patriotic, left- and right-wing groups have been allowed to operate more freely. We argue Kremlin legitimation strategies have gradually accommodated more of the discourses of the reconfigured patriotic forces, who now play the role of a loyal opposition that, while not deviating from key Kremlin statist priorities and securitised areas, have some agency in presenting social grievances and alternative ideological agendas. Examining systemic opposition, alternative media (Tsargrad) patriotic NGOs (Sorok Sorokov) and other ultra-right groups and influential thinktanks in this period, the paper provides a map of ideological entrepreneurs, eco-systems and factional competition. This mapping is of key interest for understanding how a post-war electoral authoritarian system may function.