Authors

Discussion

The February Revolution brought into being briefly a Russia that was recognizably seeking to emulate the Western democracies and pledged to remain faithful to its predecessor’s commitment to its Entente partners in the fight against Germany.  This epochal change played a significant role in swaying Wilson’s decision to enter the war.  After the October revolution, American (as well as British and French) statecraft encountered a stark choice: whether to elicit cooperation from the Bolshevik leadership to minimize harm to imperiled Western front or to attempt to dislodge the Bolsheviks from power.  This was above all an epistemological crisis, one of contending claims to knowing and understanding the reality of a novel and unprecedented situation.  It is interesting and revealing to contrast American diplomacy under Wilson to the more traditionally informed outlooks of Britain and France.

Since this period marked the first engagement of the United States in a conflict among European powers, and since American foreign policy was predicated on a claim to be acting without motives of territorial aggrandizement and for a just peace for all parties, the contrasts between the diplomatic approaches of the three main interlocutors of Russia in this crucial period  – the US, France and Britain – reveals telling contrasts in how judgements were reached and options were weighed by the three powers.