The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between military intervention in Soviet Russia and the British government’s perception of German interests. In 1918, following the Soviet exit from the First World War, the British military sought to prevent Germany from making gains in the East, and in doing so commenced a policy of direct intervention. Germany’s ostensible influence in Soviet Russia has also been cited as a major factor in Britain’s policy following the end of the First World War, particularly in relation to relaxations of the Allies’ blockade. Some in the British government believed German influence in Soviet Russia through economic ties was inevitable, and that the process had already begun – a narrative that anti-Bolshevik Russians were keen to stress. However, the perception of Germany being a power on the brink of gaining hegemony of Soviet Russia did not go unchallenged. As military intervention came to end it was becoming clearer to British observers that post-war Germany lacked the economic capacity to dominate commerce as some feared it could. This view also found traction in economic assessments of British policy in Soviet Russia. Consequently, by the beginning of 1920 policy was not being shaped by fears of German expansion, but rather an apparent window of opportunity that presented itself for British companies to gain an advantage in the race for Russian markets.
