Authors

Nina CASPERSEN²; Sophie GUEUDET¹;  ¹ Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Norway;  ² University of York, UK

Discussion

Patron states have played a crucial role in the creation of most de facto states, by supporting the military victory that ensured their de facto independence and by aiding their subsequent state-building efforts. The patron state has helped to consolidate the status quo, protect the de facto state against forced reintegration into the parent state, and provide support that may make the goal of full independence more realisable. However, this support is not unconditional. If their own interests are at stake, or they run short of resources, patron states may decide to negotiate on behalf of their clients and agree to compromises detrimental to the latter. Or they may simply choose not to intervene.
Territorial losses, forced reintegration, or acceptance of a status short of independence all represent significant setbacks for de facto states bent on achieving independence. This may lead the de facto state to blame its former protector for having failed to safeguard its interests. In such cases, how is the patron-client relationship renegotiated and how does it affect the balance of power between the patron and the client? We seek to answer those questions through a comparative study of relations between Serbia and Republika Srpska, following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, and between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh following the significant territorial losses suffered in 2020. The analysis draws on primary sources, including archival materials and oral interviews.